Gender Divisions of Paid and Unpaid Work in Contemporary UK Couples by McMunn, A et al.
 1 
 
Gender divisions of paid and unpaid work in contemporary UK couples 
Anne McMunn, Department of Epidemiology & Public Health, UCL 
 
Lauren Bird, School of Public Health, Imperial College 
 
Elizabeth Webb, Department of Epidemiology & Public Health, UCL 
 
Amanda Sacker, Department of Epidemiology & Public Health, UCL 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article uses data from the UK Household Longitudinal Study to describe how 
contemporary British couples divide a range of work types. Our findings support the 
hypothesis, suggested by previous authors, that a shared egalitarian ideology is required for 
gender equality in divisions of work. In response to bargaining theories, the article also 
hypothesises that differentials in educational attainment within couples are more strongly 
associated with gender divisions of work when couple’s gender ideology is in conflict. 
Interaction analysis does not support this hypothesis.  
 
Keywords: gender divisions of work, gender ideology 
 
Corresponding author: Anne McMunn, UCL Research Department of Epidemiology & 
Public Health, 1-19 Torrington Place, London WC1E 7HB, a.mcmunn@ucl.ac.uk   
 2 
 
Introduction 
Despite several decades of progress towards gender equality in the workplace, studies 
continue to consistently show women performing the majority of unpaid domestic work in 
every country studied (Craig and Mullan, 2011), and the transition to parenthood acts as a 
trigger for a reversion towards a more traditional ‘separate spheres’ division of work 
(Argyrous et al., 2017). There is evidence to suggest that this ‘reset’ in gender relations 
carries on throughout adulthood (Kuhhirt, 2012), and permeates material as well as time 
resources, including gender inequality in earnings and promotion over the life course (Sigle-
Rushton and Waldfogel, 2007). A large body of evidence has sought to explain persistent 
gender inequality in divisions of work at both the macro-level, drawing on cross-national 
comparison (for example, Fuwa, 2004; Knudsen and Waerness, 2008), and at the individual-
level within couples (Baxter and Hewitt, 2013; Cunningham, 2005, 2007). Sullivan and 
colleagues (2018) present a theoretical framework for explaining the lagged change in gender 
divisions of work which combines these two perspectives by linking gender socialisation in 
early life with couple-level interactions in adulthood within a wider context of ideological 
norms, social policy environments and material constraints. This framework suggests a vital 
role at the micro-level for negotiations and decision-making regarding the dividing of work 
within couples. Micro-level explanations for persistent gender inequality in the division of 
work within couples have centred around three theoretical models: time availability (Bianchi 
et al., 2006; Raley et al., 2012), economic models focused on relative and absolute material 
resources within couples (Kuhhirt, 2012), and socialisation models focusing on the role of 
gender norms and ideology (Evertsson, 2014). While there is evidence to suggest that gender 
ideology plays a major role (Cunningham, 2005; Evertsson, 2014), results differ depending 
on national context and measures considered and have yet to suggest a definitive explanation 
(Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard, 2010). In this article we argue that extending these micro-
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perspectives from an individual to a couple-level analysis, and considering the role of 
couples’ shared gender ideology and educational background, will provide further 
understanding of gender divisions of work.  
This article makes use of the household structure of the UK Household Longitudinal 
Study (UKHLS) to investigate how contemporary working-age British couples divide a range 
of work types. The study adds to previous research by examining associations between shared 
gender ideology and educational background – homogamy in attitudes and educational 
attainment, and the role of his and her ideology – and couples’ division of work. The study 
also asks whether differences in educational attainment are more strongly associated with 
gender divisions of work when couples’ gender ideology is in conflict. In what follows we 
review current evidence on micro-level explanations for persistent gender divisions of work 
within couples, highlighting the benefits of taking a couple-level approach to investigating 
homogamy and the role of gender ideology in couples’ division of total labour.  
 
Background 
Theories explaining persistent gender divisions of work  
Economic bargaining theories 
Several theories for explaining persistent gender inequality in domestic work have been 
posited and tested empirically. One explanation comes from an economic perspective 
emphasising differences in bargaining power as a result of differential access to resources, 
often operationalized as relative differences in income (Aassve et al., 2014). According to 
this perspective, the partner with greater power is able to negotiate less participation in 
domestic work (the underlying assumption being that housework is unpleasant and people 
want to avoid it). Longitudinal evidence for economic bargaining models is mixed. Share of 
income has been associated with housework hours in both Australia  and Sweden, although 
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men did less housework than women regardless of relative resources in both countries 
(Baxter and Hewitt, 2013; Evertsson and Nermos, 2007). Two recent German studies found 
relative earnings had little effect on divisions of domestic work within couples (Kuhhirt, 
2012; Nitsche and Grunow, 2016). In the UK, there are conflicting results. While Kan (2008) 
finds that housework hours significantly decrease with increases in relative income, using the 
same data set, Schober (2013) finds that absolute, rather than relative, income influences 
shifts towards more traditional divisions of work upon entry into parenthood. Other studies 
suggest that absolute income is more important than relative income for predicting the 
number of hours that women spend doing housework as higher levels of income enable 
couples to purchase external work (Gupta, 2006). 
Gender ideology theories 
Economic bargaining theories stress the role of rationality in couples’ decision-making. 
However, this approach does not explain that fact that men continue to do less domestic work 
than women even in couples where women have more resources (Kuhhirt, 2012) and pays 
inadequate attention to the role of social norms in influencing intra-household gender 
dynamics (Agarwal, 1997). So we must turn to alternative explanations such as socialisation 
theories emphasising the influence of gender ideology. As described by Sullivan and 
colleagues (2018), gender norms influence all levels of society, from macro-level government 
policies and distribution of resources, to the micro-level of individual attitudes and 
behaviours. This study follows Davis and Greenstein (2009) and Evertsson (2014) in using 
the term ‘gender ideology’ to encapsulate the continuum in individual-level attitudes 
regarding the notion of ‘separate spheres’ in gender divisions of laour within couples. Gender 
ideology is fairly consistently associated with gender divisions in work in expected 
directions: women with more egalitarian attitudes do less domestic work and more paid work 
than traditional women while men with more egalitarian attitudes do more domestic work 
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than more traditional men (Aassve et al., 2014; Cunningham, 2005), although such 
associations are not always interpreted as causal.  
Yet, even in the presence of egalitarian ideology, gender divisions of work persist as 
do paradoxical feelings of fairness amongst both men and women regarding this persistent 
unequal distribution (Carriero, 2011). In their review of explanations for persistent gender 
inequality in housework, Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard (2010) conclude that “no 
perspective yet offers a clear explanation of why women still do the bulk of housework even 
when they display the personal characteristics that favor a more egalitarian division of 
household labour.” (p. 774). We suggest that this may partly be because broader social norms 
support the maintenance of traditional gender identities and divisions of work (to a greater or 
lesser extent depending on the cultural context), and while gender ideology is becoming more 
egalitarian over time, change is happening more quickly for women than for men, on average 
(Taylor and Scott, 2018) which suggests a certain level of potential disagreement within 
couples. As Evertsson (2014) notes, the strength of gender norms is such that a shared 
egalitarian ideology may be required for couples to achieve greater gender equality in 
divisions of work. Thus, this article proposes that investigating gender ideology jointly within 
couples may have more explanatory power in its associations with gender divisions of work, 
and that the concept of ‘homogamy’, mainly used in the study of educational similarity 
within couples (Blossfeld and Timm, 2003), may also be useful in the study of gender 
ideology within couples.  
Studies are limited in the extent to which they consider both partners’ gender ideology 
and those that do consider them separately rather than jointly. Studies in Sweden (Evertsson, 
2014) and the UK (Schober, 2013) have shown that his and her ideology significantly 
influences their own number of housework hours. In Sweden women’s behaviour is also 
influenced by their partner’s ideology: those with egalitarian partners spend less time on 
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housework than those with less egalitarian partners, but women’s gender ideology is not 
associated with the amount of time their male partners spend on housework (Evertsson, 
2014). Evidence from Britain suggests that women’s gender ideology only influences their 
own housework and paid work hours, not those of their partner, and there is no association 
for men between gender ideology (theirs or their partner’s) and hours spent in housework or 
paid work (Schober, 2013). A study in Germany found that the ideology of each partner 
equally and significantly predicted divisions in housework (Nitsche and Grunow, 2016). No 
study has yet to look at the agreement or homogamy of gender ideology between couples. 
Time availability and gender divisions of total labour 
The time availability hypothesis is a third explanation for persistent gender inequality in the 
performance of domestic work and says that individuals who spend more time on paid work 
have less time to spend on domestic work (Bianchi et al., 2006; Raley et al., 2012). Time 
availability models point to evidence that both women and men who are employed perform 
less housework than those who are not (Bianchi et al, 2006). However, rather than being an 
explanatory theory for gender divisions of work, time availability models are, in fact, a 
description of the very phenomenon they seek to explain – gender divisions of work. Men 
and women’s allocation of time to one form of work form over another is, at heart, the 
definition of gender divisions of work. Time availability models assume that employment 
hours influence availability for domestic work equally for men and women. However, 
evidence suggests that this is not the case. Using Australian time use data, Craig and Powell 
(2011) showed that mothers spent more time on domestic work when their partners worked 
non-standard hours, but the inverse was not true; mother’s work schedules did not influence 
their partner’s time use allocation. Other evidence regarding the influence of women’s work 
hours on men’s time use is more mixed (Cunningham, 2007; Raley et al., 2012). Results 
fairly consistently showing that women do more childcare and housework than men 
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regardless of levels of paid employment (Chelsey and Flood, 2017), with working mother 
likely to forego personal time to ensure they continue to provide quality parental care 
(Bianchi et al., 2006). 
Couples are likely to consider all work responsibilities in their decision-making about 
how work is divided between them within wider processes of gender relations, such as 
gendered norms and ideology, but also gender inequality in pay and gendered expectations in 
the workplace. For this reason, rather than considering participation in one type of work as 
explaining participation in another, we consider all gendered work types in combination. In 
doing so we follow Glucksmann’s (1995) “Total Social Organisation of Labour” (TSOL) 
which she developed as a descriptive framework for broadening the conceptualization of 
labour – and the scope of labour research – to move beyond paid market employment. Both 
Crompton (2006) and Gornick and Meyers (2003) have usefully drawn on the TSOL in 
developing frameworks for thinking about gender divisions of labour at the macro-level. To 
our knowledge this is the first study which seeks to operationalize the TSOL empirically at 
the couple level.  
Hypotheses 
This article builds on current evidence by investigating the ways that couples in the UK 
divide and/or share multiple types of work simultaneously, and then by examining potential 
couple-level explanations for these gender divisions, more specifically couples’ homogamy 
in their gender ideology and educational attainment. By considering multiple work types 
simultaneously within couples, we potentially identify non-normative and less common ways 
of dividing work which are unlikely to be uncovered by looking at the number of hours spent 
in work types separately at the individual level. Within the couple, we ask whether a shared 
egalitarian ideology is required for gender equality in work divisions, as suggested by 
Evertsson (2014), and what happens when couples disagree in their ideology. UK trend data 
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on men and women’s attitudes suggest fairly dramatic shifts towards more egalitarian 
ideologies (Phillips et al, 2018); however, there is like be a relatively high proportion of 
couples in which the man has more traditional attitudes than his female partner (Taylor and 
Scott, 2018). This may partly explain the lack of behavioural change in this area with 
evidence from Sweden suggesting that men’s gender ideology was more influential on their 
partner’s housework hours than women’s (Evertsson, 2014). Thus, we investigate whether 
men’s ideology is more strongly associated with the gender divisions of work within couples 
where there is disagreement. Finally, where couple’s couples disagree in their gender 
ideology, perceptions of status may influence bargaining processes regarding divisions of 
work types (Kan, 2008). One potential source of status distinction is educational attainment 
(Datta Gupta & Stratton, 2010). Thus, we also ask whether differentials in educational 
attainment within couples is particularly important when couples disagree in their gender 
ideology. Based on previous theoretical and empirical literature, we hypothesise the 
following: 
1. Persistent gender norms and an ambivalent policy environment mean that, while more 
sharing across work forms will occur amongst younger couples, domestic work will 
fall primarily to women across division-of-work groups. 
2. The strength of gendered social norms means that a shared egalitarian ideology is 
required for a more equal division of work.  
3. Because the UK is still emerging from a traditional status quo in which change in 
behaviour in the domestic sphere is largely required by men, men’s gender ideology 
will be more strongly associated with couples’ division of work than women’s gender 
ideology. 
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4. Educational differences within couples will be more strongly associated with gender 
divisions of work in expected directions (more education linked with greater 
participation in paid market work and less in unpaid domestic work) when couples are 
conflicting in their ideology. 
The main contribution of this study is to focus theoretical and empirical attention at the level 
of the couple, first in providing a detailed picture of how contemporary UK couples are 
currently dividing their total work responsibilities, and, then by examining associations with 
shared gender ideology, and educational homogamy. Yet we recognize the importance of 
macro-level social context in influencing couple’s decision-making regarding work forms 
(Fuwa, 2004). A key characteristic of the UK context has been the dominance of the 
‘modified male-breadwinner’ model, in which fathers are employed full-time and mothers 
part-time, as a way of combining employment and parenting in the context of relatively little 
provision for childcare and parental leave, and a culture of long work hours amongst full-time 
employees (Crompton, 2006). Maternity leave provision has improved in the UK over the 
past twenty years with statutory maternity leave extended to 12 months in 2006, although 
many of the couples in our study would have had their children prior to this time. Since 2003, 
UK fathers have access to two weeks of statutory paternity leave, but as of April 2015, 
mothers can opt to give some of their leave provision to their partners; however, uptake of 
this option remains very low. In terms of childcare, tax-free vouchers for 15 hours of 
childcare per week became available to parents of children aged 3+ in 2005, but the sector 
remains under-funded which limits the number of places available to parents. In relation to 
adult social care, the UK relies largely on informal family provision (Carers Trust, 2018).  
 
Methods 
Data 
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This study and takes advantage of the household structure of the large, national UK 
Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS). UKHLS is a large panel survey of around 40,000 
households who have been surveyed annually since 2009/10. Because our focus in on gender, 
we restrict our sample to co-resident, opposite sex couples of working age. We include 
couples across working ages, rather than those in the early years of childrearing, as gendered 
divisions of work have been shown to persist well beyond transitions to parenthood (Loretto 
and Vickerstaff, 2015). All household members aged 16+ are invited to participate and 
opposite sex, co-resident couples at wave 2 in which both partners were aged 16-65 years 
were included. Wave 2 was selected as it was the first wave to collect information on the 
number of hours spent doing housework and caregiving. The analytic sample for this study 
included 8,513 couples who had complete information on all of our variables of interest. This 
is 70% of the 12,156 working age opposite-sex couples with information on all work 
variables. The two samples did not differ significantly on any of the analysis variables 
(analysis available upon request). Most of the reduction in sample was due to missing data on 
measures of gender attitudes.  
 
Measures 
Gender divisions of work 
We include four types of work to create a typology of gender divisions of ‘total labour’ 
within couples. We have selected work types that are generally of interest in this area due to 
their gendered nature: housework, paid employment and childcare. We extend this to include 
adult care in recognition that gender divisions of work persist beyond the childrearing years 
and adult caregiving remains gendered (Author A, Author B). Seven work variables were 
used in the latent class analysis: weekly hours spent in paid work (two variables: one for his 
hours, one for her hours), weekly hours providing care for an adult (two variables: his and 
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hers), and weekly hours spent doing housework (two variables: his and hers), and one 
variable for the mother’s report of who has main responsibility for childcare if there are 
children in the household (mother, partner, shared or other). The latter was reported by both 
partners, but to avoid collinearity, only mothers’ reports were used. Details of the latent class 
analysis are provided in the ‘Analytic Techniques’ section below.    
 
Gender ideology within couples 
Initially, separate gender ideology scales were derived for each member of the couple by 
combining responses to the following five items asking about attitudes towards gender 
divisions of work (see Annex). Responses were scored from 0-4, from strongly agree to 
strongly disagree (items 3 and 5 were reverse coded) and the five items were summed to give 
a scale score ranging 0-20 with higher scores indicating more egalitarian and lower scores 
indicating more traditional attitudes. As shown in Annex Table 2, women were a little more 
egalitarian than men, on average (mean = 12.7 for women and 12.1 for men). The 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient for his and her gender ideology scores was 0.43. In order 
to investigate couple homogamy in gender ideology, we categorized the gender ideology 
scores into tertiles and based on his and her tertiles we derived the following five category 
couple-level gender ideology variable: If both were in the most egalitarian tertile they were 
‘Both egalitarian’, if both in the most traditional tertile, ‘Both traditional’ and if both in the 
middle tertile, ‘Both middling’. Couples in which women were in a more egalitarian tertile 
than their partners appear in the ‘Woman more egalitarian’ group, and couples in which men 
were more egalitarian than their partners appear in the ‘Man more egalitarian’. 
 
Educational differentials within couples 
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Because earnings are intrinsically linked to past and current labour market participation, the 
use of relative earnings to measure potential power differentials is problematic for this study 
which focuses on describing interwoven work types, including paid work. Studies have 
shown relative education to relate to divisions of housework in a similar way to relative 
income measures (Datta Gupta and Stratton, 2010); thus, we use differences in educational 
attainment, although we recognize that educational differences are not a direct measure of 
decisional power within couples. Six categories of highest educational attainment were used: 
1. ‘no qualifications’, 2.’“other qualifications’ 3. “GCSEs or equivalent’ (lower secondary 
education to age 16) 4. ‘A levels or equivalent’ (higher secondary education to age 18) 
5.’degree’ or 6. ‘higher degree.’ Couples were then grouped into three categories: those in 
which men and women had equal educational attainment (35%), those in which men had 
higher attainment than their partners (31%), and those in which women had higher 
educational attainment than their partners (34%). Amongst those who had equal attainment, it 
was common for both members of the couple to have A-level or GCSE qualifications, 
making up about a third of this group. In couples with unequal attainment than their partners, 
the largest groups, had A-level qualifications combined with a partner who attained GCSE 
qualifications. The remainder of this group was spread fairly evenly across attainment 
combinations although very few people with degrees or higher degrees with partners who had 
no educational qualifications. These patterns were equally true regardless of whether it was 
men or women who had higher qualifications than their partners. 
 
Covariates 
Each covariate was selected on the basis of both empirical evidence and conceptual 
plausibility of associations with divisions of work, as well as gender ideology. Age of both 
members of the couple with the average age of the couple was used in multivaritate 
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regression models. Equivalised household income was derived using the household’s net 
income and an OECD equivalization variable; equivalised household income is continuous 
and in thousands of pounds. Women’s income as a share of household income is also shown 
in descriptive results. Marriage is a highly gendered institution and has been shown to be 
associated with gender ideology (Fan and Marini, 2000). Therefore, we control for whether 
couples are formally married or not as well as the number of pre-school aged children (ages 
0-4) and number of school aged children (5-15) in the household. 
 
Analytic Techniques 
This article builds on previous work considering multiple work types separately 
(Kuhhirt, 2012; Schober, 2013), by characterising how couples divide multiple work types 
simultaneously. Four work types previously shown to be gendered are included: paid market 
work, unpaid domestic housework, unpaid domestic childcare and unpaid informal provision 
of care to an adult. To do this, we adopt a latent class approach. Latent class analysis (LCA) 
is a statistical method which can be used to cluster individuals into groups based on their 
similarity on observed characteristics that are thought to represent an underlying theoretical 
concept, in this case, divisions of total labour. Here LCA is used to categorise couples based 
on the amount of work that each member does in relation to four work types. The approach 
taken to select the number of division-of-work groups was largely empirical, although this 
empirical approach was conceptually informed as we will explain. A two-group model was 
first fitted and then the number of groups increased, assessing the fit of each using Akaike’s 
Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), and the model’s best log 
likelihood. Moving through solutions with a greater number of groups, model fit was still 
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improving at the eleven group solution according to the AIC, BIC and log likelihood criteria.1 
However, the models with 9 and more groups produced some very small groups (less than 
1% of the sample) that were indistinct conceptually from other small groups. We say our 
empirical approach was conceptually informed because, while changes to the BIC slowed 
after the seven class solution, we chose eight groups as the additional class provided an 
important conceptual distinction, drawing a group of dual-earner couples who were providing 
care to an adult. The resulting eight gender-division-of-work groups are described in the 
results section. A table showing the distribution of the seven work variables within each LCA 
division-of-work group appears in the Annex Table 1. 
To investigate the extent to which indicators of couples’ homogamy in gender 
ideology and educational attainment were associated with divisions of work, multinomial 
logistic regression was conducted with the work groups as the outcome variable. These 
models included each of the covariates, couples’ joint gender ideology, and couples’ 
educational homogamy. Models were then rerun with the addition of an interaction term 
between couples’ gender ideology and educational homogamy (not shown in the Table). 
Once the eight-group solution was accepted, the LCA, multinomial regressions and 
interaction analysis were all run together using Mplus 7. 
 
Results 
Gender divisions of work in contemporary couples in the UK 
The Figure shows the percentage of couples in each of the eight division-of-work groups 
derived by the LCA, and the groups are shaded from darkest to lightest to denote a grading of 
                                                          
1 We sought changes in the BIC or AIC between N and N+1 classes of < 10 (Burnham et al., 
2011); however, the minimum difference in either BIC or AIC across our models was > 600. 
So we adopted a pragmatic criterion of no class smaller than N = 100, or 1% in conjunction 
with consideration of the conceptual distinction between the groups produced. 
 
 15 
 
most to least egalitarian in their divisions of work. The Annex Table 2 shows the 
demographic, social and economic characteristics of each of the groups. 
Half of the groups could be considered to display a relatively egalitarian division of 
work. Two small groups may be considered the most egalitarian: 6% of couples in a female-
earner group (‘Female-earner/shared-domestic’ in Figure and Tables), and 1% in a group in 
which men spent long hours doing housework (‘Male long hours domestic’). The female-
earner was the only group in which men’s contribution to the housework was similar to their 
partner’s, and this group had the highest proportion of women with educational qualifications 
higher than their partners. While men tended to be older than women across the study on 
average, this age gap was considerably wider amongst female-earner couples, suggesting 
these non-employed male partners may have taken early retirement. Female-earner couples 
were less likely than many other groups to have dependent children at home. 
The ‘Male long hours domestic’ group was marked by male non-employment and 
housework – all men in this group spent more than twenty hours per week on housework – 
and, while most women did housework too, 30% did not (which was much higher than other 
groups). This group had relatively high levels of adult caregiving responsibilities, and men 
did more than women with over 40% of men in these couples providing 20 or more hours of 
adult caregiving per week. Given the relatively high levels of adult care for men in these 
couples, we checked whether they were caring for their female partner, but this was not 
generally the case. These two groups had the highest levels of men having main 
responsibility for childcare, at about a quarter of those who had children under age 16 at 
home (although only 30% of female-earner couples had children under age 16 at home).  
The other two relatively egalitarian groups were two groups of dual-earner couples. In 
the largest group of all, at 41% of all couples, both members of the couple were in full-time 
employment and had little or no caregiving responsibilities (‘Dual-earner/low-care’). Men in 
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these couples performed more housework than in some of the other groups, although women 
still did more of the housework than their partners, as was the case with nearly all of the 
groups. Eight percent of couples were in the other dual-earner group (‘Dual-earners/dual-
caregiver’) which was distinguished by adult caregiving responsibility: all women in this 
group spent at least some time during the week providing care to an adult and half of all men 
did as well. Despite all women in this group combining employment with caregiving for an 
adult, they still performed more housework than men. A majority of couples in this group did 
not have dependent children at home. The two dual-earner groups had the highest incomes. 
Two percent of couples were in a group (‘Male-earner long hours/female-earner + 
domestic’) in which women were employed, about half part-time, but men worked long 
hours: every man in this group worked 60 hours per week or longer. Perhaps for this reason, 
women in these couples combined paid employment with relatively high levels of childcare 
responsibility and spent more time on housework than women in many other couples.  
Two groups were characterized by a highly traditional division of work. In the largest 
of these, and the second largest group over all at 28%, men were predominately employed 
full-time, while over half of women were not in paid work, and the remaining were employed 
part-time (‘Male-earner/female-domestic’). Women in these couples performed large 
amounts of housework, with over half spending more than twenty hours per week on 
housework, and 63% of men contributed fewer than 5 hours housework per week. Seventy 
percent of these couples had children under 16 in the home, and women had responsibility for 
childcare in the large majority of cases. The smallest group to emerge (at 1%) was a highly 
traditional group of couples (‘Male-earner/female long hours domestic’) in which all of the 
women performed 20 hours or more of housework per week and 60% of men reported doing 
less than five hours of housework per week. Over two-thirds of women in these most 
traditional couples were not in paid work with nearly a quarter employed part-time. The 
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majority (four-fifths) had children aged under 16 years at home, with the majority reporting 
childcare as being mostly the woman’s responsibility.  
The third most common group (at 13%) was somewhat older, generally in their fifties 
and early sixties, and were characterized by low work attachment for both members of the 
couple, and little to no caregiving responsibilities as they generally did not have school-age 
or pre-school children at home (‘Non-employed/low-care’). Women in these couples did 
relatively high levels of housework, suggesting that these couples may have previously 
followed a traditional gender division of work. This, combined with the age profile and lack 
of dependent children at home suggests that this group of couples had children previously and 
are in the ‘empty nester’ life stage; indeed, they may have grandparental care responsibilities 
outside the home. They had the lowest median income of all groups. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Homogamy in gender ideology and couples’ divisions of work 
In unadjusted bi-variate results (Annex Table 2), both groups of traditional male-earner 
couples were much more likely to hold a homogamous traditional gender ideology (at 21%-
23% each compared with 14% amongst couples overall) and least likely to hold a 
homogamous egalitarian gender ideology, particularly for the small group of extremely 
traditional ‘Male-earner, female long hours domestic’ couples, amongst whom only 2% held 
homogamous egalitarian ideologies compared with 21% in couples overall. Similarly, both 
groups of dual-earner couples and the female-earner couples were more likely to hold a 
homogamous egalitarian gender ideology (27-30% for dual-earner couples and 24% for 
female-earner couples).  
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Table 1 shows odds ratios for the multinomial regression models. The odds ratios 
compare each of the division-of-work groups with the most common group, the ‘Dual-
earner/low care’ group. Odds ratios greater than one suggest that couples in that group are 
more likely than the reference group to have the characteristic in question and an odds ratio 
lower than one suggests that they are less likely. So, the Table shows that, after adjusting for 
all covariates including educational differentials within couples, couples that don’t share an 
egalitarian gender ideology are significantly more likely to be in one of the two male-earner 
groups, the ‘Male-earner long hours/female-earner + domestic’ group in which men worked 
long hours and women combined employment with domestic work, or in the ‘Non-
employed/low care’ group than in the ‘Dual-earner/low care’ group, suggesting that a shared 
egalitarian ideology is required for less traditional divisions of work. Couples who share a 
traditional gender ideology are extremely likely to be in one of the two male-earner groups, 
particularly in the most traditional ‘Male-earner/female long hours domestic’ group. 
Differences between the non-homogamous groups were small, suggesting that men’s 
gender ideology was not more strongly associated with couple’s division of work than 
women’s gender ideology. There were no significant differences in gender ideology between 
the four groups with more egalitarian divisions of work – the two dual-earner groups, the 
female-earner and the male domestic work groups.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Homogamy in educational attainment and couples’ divisions of work 
Even after controlling for gender ideology, differences in educational attainment were 
associated with some division-of-work groups. Men had higher educational qualifications 
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than their partners in the ‘Male-earner/female domestic’ group and lower educational 
qualifications than their female partners in ‘Female-earner/shared domestic’ couples. Women 
were less likely to have higher qualifications than their partners in the ‘Non-employed/low 
care’ group.  We hypothesized that educational differentials may be more important in 
couples whose gender ideologies were in conflict. Interaction analysis of couples’ shared 
gender ideology and differences in their educational attainment (not shown) did not show 
differences according to education differentials in the non-homogamous gender ideology 
couples. Rather, interaction analysis showed that, couples were significantly more likely to be 
in the most traditional division of work group (the ‘Male-earner/female long hours domestic’ 
group) when men had higher educational qualifications than their partners and the couples 
shared a homogamous traditional ideology. 
 
Discussion 
Using a large, nationally representative study of UK couples, this article has asked whether a 
shared egalitarian ideology is associated with more egalitarian sharing of four gendered work 
types, and, where gender ideology is in conflict, whether men’s ideology was more strongly 
associated with divisions of work than women’ ideology. Finally, the study explores whether 
educational differences are more strongly associated with gender divisions of work when 
couples’ gender ideology is in conflict. Results supported only the first of these hypotheses. 
This article has also provided a novel description of divisions of work within contemporary 
British couples across four work types simultaneously, revealing some unfamiliar groups and 
providing richer understanding of different ways that well-known couple types divide 
multiple work forms. 
By conducting couple-level analysis of homogamy in gender ideology, this study 
suggests that a shared egalitarian ideology is required for a more equal division of work, and 
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one egalitarian ideology within a couple is not sufficient in the face of slow-to-change gender 
norms. This builds on previous work showing that gender divisions of work persist in the face 
of individual egalitarian ideology (Evertsson, 2014). Based on previous results showing men 
to be more likely than women to hold traditional views on gender (Taylor and Scott, 2018), 
and evidence from Sweden suggesting that men’s ideology influenced women’s housework 
hours, but women’s ideology did not influence men’s (Evertsson, 2014), our second 
hypothesis was that men’s ideology would be more strongly associated with divisions of 
work than women’ ideology. While women were more likely than men to hold egalitarian 
gender attitudes in our study, our second hypothesis was not supported. Differences between 
these results and those from the Swedish study are unlikely to reflect differences in national 
context given stronger egalitarian social norms in Sweden compared with the UK. Most 
likely, the difference is explained by the focus on couple-level ideological homogamy here; 
the effect of gender ideology on housework hours may be contingent on partner’s ideology in 
Sweden as it appears to be in the UK. The majority of previous studies have focused on 
individual level associations, and our results are broadly in line with their fairly consistent 
finding that egalitarian gender ideology is associated fewer hours spent in domestic work 
amongst women (Nitsche and Grunow, 2016).  
Despite the strength of association we find between shared egalitarian gender 
ideology and divisions of work, it is important to note that women still did more domestic 
work than men in our two largest egalitarian groups (both dual-earner groups). It was only in 
female-earner couples and the very small group of men doing long hours of domestic work 
that men did as much or more domestic work than women. This suggests that even a shared 
egalitarian ideology may not be sufficient to counter potential obstacles to equal sharing in 
the UK. It is also important to highlight the limitation of the cross-sectional design of this 
study as evidence suggests that gender attitudes shift after transitions to partnership and 
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parenthood as men and women adapt their attitudes to the reality of their lived experience 
(Carlson and Lynch, 2013).  
Our findings on differences in educational attainment and gender divisions of work 
are largely in line with those showing links between relative earnings and divisions of 
domestic work (Kan, 2008). These associations are likely to reflect a range of processes. 
Higher educational qualifications may increase bargaining power through status differentials 
and/or a greater earning potential. Also, higher educational attainment may make 
employment easier to maintain. Our analysis extended this work to show educational 
differences between couples to be most strongly linked with their division of work when they 
share a traditional ideology. In particular, couples’ with a shared traditional ideology in 
which the man had higher educational qualifications than their female partner were the most 
likely to be in the small group with an extremely traditional division of work whose key 
distinguishing feature was the long hours of housework women were doing. It is not possible 
to disentangle the causal processes for these couples in our study design. Descriptive results 
show that women in this group were amongst the most likely to have no educational 
qualifications (Annex Table 2). It is possible that this group is comprised of ethnic or 
religious groups that espouse traditional gender norms. We have not investigated ethnicity or 
religious affiliation as part of this study, but others have shown ethnic variation in women’s 
employment in this data set (Khoudja & Platt, 2018).  
Our focus on couple-level analysis extends to our method for characterising divisions 
of work within couples. This has uncovered some less-known, distinct types of division as 
well as fleshing out more detail and variation in the standard binaries of dual-earner/more 
egalitarian – male-earner/more traditional. In addition to the small group of extremely 
traditional couples in which women performed high levels of housework described above, 
our results uncovered a small group of couples in which men were not employed and did high 
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levels of housework and care for adults and children. Our results also identified a group of 
couples in which women had stronger ties to paid employment than their male partners and in 
which housework was shared equally. Couples in this group were a little bit older and were 
much less likely than most other groups to have school-aged children at home, so it may be 
that non-employment for men in these couples was due to early retirement or unemployment 
rather than exiting the labour market to care for children or adults. It was only by considering 
the combination of work types together that our study was able to identify these less common 
groups of couples combining work forms in novel ways.  
Even amongst the more commonly expected division-of-work groups, considering 
multiple work types together in combination revealed additional complexity. A straight-
forward ‘modified male-breadwinner’ model that is generally considered the hallmark format 
for families combining work and parenting in the UK (Crompton, 2006) did not emerge from 
our analysis. Rather, when multiple work types were considered together for both members 
of the couple, women employed part-time were generally combined with non-employed 
women in the main male-earner groups, or were combined with full-time employed women to 
form the small group of employed women partnered with men working extremely long hours 
each week. These, often highly educated, women epitomized a ‘second shift’, combining paid 
employment with high levels of housework and childcare, potentially struggling to maintain 
their investment in employment during childcare years with a partner strongly committed to 
paid market work. In addition, our inclusion of adult care distinguished a second, smaller 
dual-earner group in which couples provided relatively high levels of adult care. Thus, we 
were able to distinguish this sub-group of dual-earners that is qualitatively different from the 
dominant, largest groups of dual-earner couples without caregiving responsibilities.  
Taken together our couple-level ‘total work’ approach suggests unfamiliar groups of 
couples who warrant further detailed study. In addition, the inclusion of couples across 
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working age meant that life stage provided some of the distinction between division-of-work 
groups which indicates the importance of following these couples over time. Because intense 
caregiving responsibilities, both for children and adults, are transitory in nature and occur 
during a relatively small fraction of the life course, couples with these responsibilities make 
up a minority in our study. Dual-earner groups, which make up the largest groups of couples, 
were generally younger and less likely to have children than more traditional groups. For the 
younger dual-earners in particular it will be important to follow these groups over time 
through the study to observe whether their divisions of work shift towards a more traditional 
set up if they become parents as has been observed so often previously (Schober, 2013). 
Indeed, our third most common group of slightly older couples in their fifties and early 
sixties, who were often not in paid employment and generally did not have school-age or pre-
school children at home, were distinguished by their life stage. These possible ‘empty 
nesters’, who may have provided care to grandchildren outside the home as this was not 
picked up by our data, held relatively traditional gender attitudes, and women in these 
couples generally had lower educational attainment than their partners  
 
Conclusion  
Results from this analysis of divisions of work in contemporary UK couples suggests that 
gender equality in divisions of work is rare and gender norms remain strong. Individual’s 
own gender ideology is a starting point for shaping behavior but currently it remains difficult 
to implement an egalitarian ideology without the support of a partner with shared ideology. 
The importance of a shared egalitarian ideology seen in our study suggests gender norms, 
perhaps through early education and both traditional and social media, as key targets for 
encouraging social change. However, even with a shared egalitarian ideology, social 
structural constraints may restrict the extent to which couple-level negotiated egalitarian 
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preferences can be acted upon, and our results do not contradict the large body of evidence 
showing that entry to parenthood remains a key life transition for gender relations within 
couples; the largest egalitarian groups in this study were less likely to have children. Studies 
suggest that fathers who are involved in parenting early-on remain more involved over time 
(Author C) and growing up in households in which fathers and mothers play an equal role in 
domestic life is likely to be key to changing gender norms regarding ‘separate spheres’. 
Evidence from Nordic countries suggests that provision of adequately-paid, ‘use it or lose it’ 
paternity leave provision and high-quality affordable childcare are pre-requisites for 
achieving substantial uptake of paternity leave and greater gender equality in employment 
(Kvande, 2017). Even with these policy supports in place, and in the context of greater 
gender equality in both norms and behaviour, Nordic women continue to do more housework 
than Nordic men (Evertsson, 2014). This suggests that such policy levers may not be 
sufficient for achieving complete equality, but they are a necessary start.  
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FIGURE 1:  PERCENTAGE OF COUPLES IN WAVE 2 OF THE UK HOUSEHOLD LONGITUDINAL STUDY IN EACH OF THE 
EIGHT COUPLE DIVISION OF WORK TYPES, SHADED DARK TO LIGHT FOR MOST (DARKEST) TO LEAST (LIGHTEST) 
EGALITARIAN IN GENDER ATTITUDES. 
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Table 1: Likelihood of being in each of the eight couple division of work types amongst couples in the UK Household Longitudinal Study wave 2, mutually 
adjusted in multivariate multinomial regression models (N = 8,513). 
 Dual-
earners/low 
care (Ref) 
(n = 3,467) 
Male 
earner/female 
domestic (n = 
2,379) 
Non-
employed/low 
care (n = 1,106) 
Dual earners, dual 
caregivers 
(n = 666) 
Female 
earner/shared 
domestic (n = 492) 
Male earner long 
hours/female 
earner + domestic 
(n = 196) 
Male long hours 
domestic (n = 120) 
Male earner/female 
long hours domestic 
(n = 87) 
 Ref  OR2 SE OR2 SE OR2 SE OR2 SE OR2 SE OR2 SE OR2 SE 
Couple average age   1.04** (0.006) 1.11** (0.009) 1.05** (0.007) 1.09** (0.009) 1.01 (0.01) 1.10** (0.02) 1.07** (0.02) 
Household income1 - - 0.44** (0.14) 0.18** (0.021) 0.98 (0.05) 0.33** (0.25) 1.03 (0.1) 0.15** (0.52) 0.52 (0.52) 
Married - - 1.02 (0.13) 2.31** (0.012) 0.86 (0.2) 2.19** (0.17) 0.77 (0.37) 2.01* (0.32) 1.09 (0.45) 
Number of children                 
0-4 years - - 3.65** (0.1) 3.05** (0.15) 0.62 (0.28) 1.26 (0.24) 1.43 (0.24) 4.41** (0.32) 5.10** (0.25) 
5-15 years - - 1.78** (0.06) 1.27** (0.09) 0.95 (0.09) 0.81 (0.11) 1.25 (0.13) 2.43** (0.16) 2.77** (0.12) 
Gender attitudes                 
Both egalitarian - - REF 
 
REF 
 
REF 
 
REF 
 
REF 
 
REF 
 
REF 
 
Both middling - - 3.78** (0.19) 1.51* (0.2) 1.12 (0.2) 0.60* (0.25) 1.73 (0.41) 1.76 (0.43) 12.07* (0.98) 
Both traditional 11.42** (0.18) 3.85** (0.21) 1.02 (0.25) 0.81 (0.28) 3.47** (0.43) 2.34 (0.45) 36.02** (0.94) 
Man more egalitarian 3.77** (0.17) 2.27** (0.19) 1.07 (0.18) 1.01 (0.2) 2.38* (0.36) 2.03 (0.38) 9.21* (0.99) 
Woman more egalitarian 2.75** (0.16) 1.79** (0.17) 0.82 (0.17) 1.01 (0.16) 2.25* (0.32) 0.88 (0.39) 11.10* (0.94) 
Couple difference in qualifications               
Equal - - REF  REF  REF  REF  REF  REF  REF  
Male higher - - 1.43** (0.12) 1.01 (0.13) 0.96 (0.16) 0.57** (0.18) 0.81 (0.3) 1.22 (0.32) 1.51 (0.41) 
Female higher - - 0.77* (0.11) 0.67** (0.13) 1.22 (0.14) 0.98 (0.15) 1.18 (0.28) 1.10 (0.3) 0.95 (0.38) 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
All analyses are weighted. Fit statistics for the model: Loglikelihood Ratio Test = -202218, AIC = 404686, BIC = 405612, Sample-Size Adjusted BIC = 405215 
1. Equivalised household income, £1000 
2. Estimates shown are Odds Ratios. 
